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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-18a-l(l) and §78-2a-3(2)(d)
(1992).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Was defendant's trial counsel's performance properly based on strategy and appropriate
defense tactics?
Where ineffective assistance of counsel claims arefirstraised on direct appeal, the issue is
reviewed as a matter of law. State v. Tennvson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1993). Such
review however, is highly deferential, to avoid the distortions of hindsight and second guessing
counsel's performance based on the inanimate record. Id.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the constitutional provisions, statutes and rules upon which the respondent
relies is set out in Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Ernie Young was convicted of the crime of battery, under Section 11.08.020,
Salt Lake City Ordinances. Defendant was convicted by a jury, the Honorable Sheila K.
McCleve presiding.
On September 27, 1993, Defendant Ernie Young and his girlfriend Karen Cadman were
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observedfightingat approximately 450 South 700 East. (Trial transcript page 8) (hereinafter T.)
Defendant previously beganfightingwith Karen at her home, when she put too much meat in his
taco. (T. 27) Karen testified that Ernie was being "mean" and so she left, and had been walking
along 700 East when defendant caught up with her and the battery was observed. (T. 27) During
the course of their argument, defendant held Karen to the ground, and struck her in the face and
stomach. (T. 8-10)
After the approach of a third person, defendant turned and walked away, while Karen
went in the opposite direction, accompanied by the third party. (T. 11, 32) Officer Mark Gross
responded to a dispatch call, and searched the area for a man or woman meeting defendant's or
Karen's description. (T. 19) Officer Gross found Karen Cadman, talking with a man who said he
had witnessed the incident. (T. 19) Karen told Officer Gross that Ernie had struck her after a
fight, and accepted a ride homefromOfficer Gross. At the home, Karen asked Officer Gross to
help her get in, as Ernie had the keys, and to look for Ernie because she was afraid he would
comeback. (T. 20)
Amanda Smith, the FendalTs employee who called police and described the incident to
Officer Gross, did not change her story regarding the events which occurred. Amanda stated she
had seen a man "beating his wife or girlfriend." (T. 8). Although on the day of the battery, Karen
told Officer Gross that Ernie had struggled with her and thrown her to the ground, and that she
was afraid or him, at trial Karen testified that Ernie was merely attempting to help calm her down,
and help herfromsitting in glass. (T. 28) Karen further claimed both that in attempting to get
her to come home, Ernie had turned her around, and that she had turned around herself,
voluntarily. (T. 29)
2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ernie Young was convicted of battery at a jury trial. Counsel's performance, however,
was not constitutionally ineffective simply because it did not produce the desired result.
Ernie Young cannot meet either prong of the constitutional test, as he cannot show
ineffectiveness or prejudice. Trial counsel's decision to not attempt to bring in a witness whose
testimony would be favorable to the prosecution cannot be considered poor performance, but
rather must be viewed as an exercise of trial strategy. Additionally, failure to present a doctor to
testify about a victim's state of mind cannot constitute unreasonable performance, given the
attenuated relevancyfromthe issues at trial. Defense counsel's decision not have her client testify
should be viewed as a trial tactic, by which she could ensure that no mention of defendant's prior
felony conviction would come before the jury. Further, the defense strategy of not objecting to
hearsay testimony should be viewed as a defense choice, by which counsel could herself cross
examine regarding those statements and then offer contradictory testimony by way of rebuttal.
No prejudice is evident in this case. Ernie Young was convicted by jurors, sitting as the
triers of fact, who had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of all the witnesses, particularly
the victim. The testimony of an independent eyewitness was presented, and was in stark contrast
to the self contradictory victim. Adding the testimony of Salt Lake City Police Officer Mark
Gross, which corroborates the uninvolved witness' testimony and some of the victim's statements
made on the date of the battery, the jury's verdict was well supported by the evidence. No
reasonable likelihood exists that absent any alleged errors, the verdict would be favorable to the
defendant.
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ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE, AND
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD THEREFORE BE AFFIRMED.
A.

Defense counsel's performance met an objective standard of
reasonableness, thus her performance was constitutionally effective.

Criminal defendants are entitled to the effective assistance of trial counsel. Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In post conviction proceedings, Utah courts review
ineffective assistance of counsel claims with a presumption that counsel made decisions as part of
their trial strategy. State v. Templin 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Trial decisions will not be
deemed to be deficient performance unless the defendant persuades a court that no conceivable
tactical basis existed for counsel's actions. State v. Moritzky. 771 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1989). In
making this determination, the reviewing court need not know counsel's strategy, nor approve of
it, but must simply be able to articulate a plausible basis for counsel's decision. State v. Tennyson.
850 P.2d 461, 467 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted).
Defendant here alleges various errors, such as trial counsel's failure to present testimony
from other witnesses, failure to object to the prosecution's questions, and refusing to let the
defendant testify at trial. Even assuming defendant's allegations are true, he fails to sustain the
burden of showing that these were not and could not have been trial tactics. This defendant
cannot do.
On appeal, defendant makes much of counsel's failure to perform an adequate
investigation. Utah cases address such issues in State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1993), and
State v. Callahan 866 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1993), relied upon by defendant. Defendant fails to
show how more investigation would produce different results. Counsel was sent the police report
4

in discovery, containing information about the witness Sky Davini. It is reasonable for this Court
to believe that the decision not to focus on Davini as a witness stemmedfromthe information
found in the police report andfromOfficer Gross himself.
At trial, counsel did not object to hearsay testimony regarding the statements of Davini to
Officer Gross, and then cross examined the witness on that topic. When the defense called Karen
Cadman, that witness was also questioned about the hearsay statements of Davini, and she
contradicted Officer Gross. Counsel obviously presented that testimony with the hope that
conflicts would be resolved in favor of defendant. Courts should not uphold ineffective assistance
claims where counsel fails to object and then attempts to use the same evidence. "It is well
established that trial tactics and strategies including what witnesses to call, what objections to
make, and by and large what defenses to put forth are generally within the prerogative of counsel
and are generally left to counsel's professional judgment." State v. Tylen 850 P.2d at 1256.
Here, appellate counsel claims that trial counsel's failure to investigate and subpoena an
eyewitness constitutes ineffectiveness. Counsel relies on an unsworn, handwritten affidavit,
submitted by defendant himself rather than by counsel, whichflatlycontradicts evidence available
to trial counsel in the police report. If indeed this extra record evidence were able to be
considered by this Court, the appropriate method would be by request for a new trial based on
new evidence, not by submitting the unsworn statement and treating it as evidence. Should this
Court feel compelled to review such evidence, it may wish to take judicial notice of the fact that
the "sworn affidavit of Sky Davini" bears remarkable resemblance to the handwriting of Ernie
Young, apparentfromthe many handwritten motionsfiledupon this Court.
Defense counsel is also alleged to have been ineffective in failing to present Karen
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Cadman's doctor to testify about the victim's anxiety attacks. Defendant presents no case law to
support the proposition that failure to produce irrelevant evidence constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel. Karen Cadman testified that she had anxiety attacks, and that Ernie was
attempting to calm her down. Further evidence about the victim's condition was not relevant to
any trial issue, as no facts ever put the victim's conduct or state of mind at issue. The jury would
be able to weigh that claim of Karen's anxiety against the facts regarding a fight about defendant's
dinner, defendant following Karen, that they yelled at each other, and that an independent person
would view their behavior as a beating.
Defendant further claims that he was not allowed to testify. It is entirely possible that trial
counsel made an evaluation as to defendant's credibility as a witness, perhaps looking at his
personality, demeanor, or temper, and determined that he would not be able to add to his case.
Or, counsel could have determined that defendant's testimony would have been duplicative of
Karen's, whileriskingthe possibility that his felony conviction may come before the jury.
Appellate counsel conveniently ignores a Utah case on point, State v. Morehouse. 748 P.2d 217
(Utah App. 1988). In Morehouse, a defendant's counsel misunderstood Utah Rule of Evidence
609 regarding admissibility of prior felony convictions, and on that basis determined not to have
the defendant testify. This Court held that such conduct was not ineffective assistance of counsel,
finding that choice to be the legitimate exercise of trial tactics.
Additionally, counsel here submitted a proposed jury instruction regarding the defendant's
right to not testify, and the proper inferences to be drawn by the jury. (See Defendant's proposed
jury instructions, Record page 46). It is anomalous to say that defendant's exercise of his
constitutional right not to testify, regarding which the jury was instructed, can also be a source of
6

error where the trial verdict is unfavorable.

B.

Defendant cannot show prejudicefromany alleged errors.

Even if any of counsel's tactics were deemed harmful, defendant must still meet his burden
of showing prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694, State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d at
467. Despite any of counsel's alleged errors, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the jury's
verdict.
Amanda Smith, an employed, seventeen year old high school student, testified that she
observed a battery in progress. She believed enough in what she saw that she immediately
reported the incident, talked with the investigating officer, and came to court to testify about the
incident. The jury was able to evaluate her demeanor and appearance, and to judge her
credibility. Amanda was never impeached regarding her ability to observe the event, or her ability
to remember it, or the strength of her belief in what she viewed. Amanda had no relationship with
either the defendant or the victim, and had no ulterior motive affecting her testimony, as did the
victim.
Amanda's testimony was contrasted with Karen Cadman's, who had changed her story,
and maintained a continuing relationship with the defendant. Karen attempted to take
responsibility for the incident, claiming that her anxiety was the cause, and that Ernie was merely
attempting to "help" her. Karen's testimony had various inconsistencies, such as accepting a ride
home from Officer Gross although she told Ernie she would go to her Grandma's, and despite her
trial testimony that she was not afraid of Ernie. Karen claimed that Ernie had turned her around,
and also that she turned herself. Karen claimed the incident was due to her problems, but never
7

offered any evidence that she had struck out at Ernie, or described any behavior on her part to
explain what Amanda had viewed
Officer Gross's testimony corroborated Amanda's testimony and parts of Karen's The
hearsay evidence regarding Sky Davini presented the jury with two potential conclusions that
Davini had corroborated Amanda Smiths's description, or that Davini said to Officer Gross that he
saw the incident and Ernie did not hit Karen The jury evidently resolved this conflict in the
evidence by believing Amanda Smith and Officer Gross
Defendant never effectively demonstrates prejudice from counsel's alleged errors
Defendant has failed to show that but for counsel's errors, the result would be different Even if
defendant's counsel were perfect, she would have had to overcome the effectiveness of an
independent and apparently highly credible eyewitness Without meeting the burden of
demonstrating prejudice, defendant's appeal must fail

C.

If the record is inadequate, the proper remedy is remand for an evidentiary
hearing

Defendant alleges no facts in support of his claim that he wished to testify and trial counsel
refused If this Court rules that without evidence of trial counsel's reasoning in determining
whether or not to have Ernie testify, it cannot decide the question, the proper resolution would be
to remand for an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
In reviewing this question, this Court should not remand the case back for a "fishing expedition "
State v Garrett 849 P 2d 578, 581-82 (Utah App 1993) As this Court noted in Garrett, the
Rule 23B remedy is available only on upon an allegation of facts in support of the ineffective
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assistance claim, with proof as a demonstrative reality and not as a speculative claim. Id, citing
State v.McNicoL 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976).
CONCLUSION
Defendant cannot meet the two pronged test to show ineffective assistance of counsel. All
of defendant's complaints regarding his trial counsel's performance address trial tactics, which will
not be second guessed by reviewing courts. Counsel's defense strategy was objectively
reasonable, and cannot be challenged simply because it was not successful.
Further, Defendant fails to show prejudice. Defendant was convicted by a jury well able
to evaluate the efficacy of his defense, and the credibility of the City's witnesses. That the victim
changed her story and was demonstrably biased in favor of the defendant was observed by the
jury. Balanced against the testimony of a credible, independent witness, and corroboration by the
investigating officer and the prior inconsistent statements of the victim, Karen Cadman's changing
testimony bears little weight. The jury's verdict was well supported by the evidence, and should
stand.
For the foregoing reasons the City requests that the jury's verdict be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this S -^fl&y of January, 1995.

Attorney for Respondent
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

11.04.140
3. Insults, taunts or challenges another by use
of telephone communication in a manner likely to
provoke a violent or disorderly response; or
4. Telephones another and knowingly makes any
false statement concerning injury, death, disfigurement, indecent conduct or criminal conduct of the
person telephoned or any member of his/her family,
or uses obscene, profane or threatening language
with intent to terrify, intimidate, harass or annoy.
The making of a false statement as herein set out
shall be prima facie evidence of intent to terrify,
intimidate, harass or annoy.
B. Telephone harassment is a Class B misdemeanor. (Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code
§ 32-1-19)

Annotated, and successor sections, or pursuant to a
criminal summons or any other order of a court, is
guilty of a Class B misdemeanor, regardless of the
disposition of die charge upon which the person was
originally cited. (Ord. 79-88 § 1, 1988)

Chapter 11.08
OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON

11.08.010
11.08.020
11.08.030
11.08.040
11.08.050
11.08.060

Assault.
Battery.
Telephone harassment.
Emergency telephone abuse.
Place of commission of offense
involving use of telephone.
Definitions—Crime of
stalking—Designated.

11.08.040
Emergency telephone abuse.
A. A person is guilty of emergency telephone
abuse if such person:
1. Intentionallyrefusesto yield or surrender the
use of a party line or a public pay telephone to
another person upon being informed that such telephone is needed to report a fire or summon police,
medical or other aid in case of emergency, unless
such telephone is likewise being used for an emergency call; or
2. Asks for orrequeststhe use of a party line or
a public pay telephone on the pretext that an emergency exists, knowing that no emergency exists.
B. Emergency telephone abuse is a Class B misdemeanor.
C. For the purposes of subsection A of this section:
1. "Emergency" means a situation in which
property or human life is in jeopardy and the
prompt summoning of aid is essential to the preservation of human life or property;
2. "Party line" means a subscriber's line or telephone circuit consisting of two or more main telephone stations connected therewith, each station
with a distinctive ring or telephone number. (Ord.
88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code § 32-1-20)

11.08.010
Assault.
An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with
a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the
person of another. It is unlawful for any person to
commit an assault within the limits of Salt Lake
City. (Prior code § 32-1-2)
11.08.020
Battery.
A battery is any wilful and unlawful use of force
or violence upon the person of another. It is unlawful for any person to commit a battery within the
limits of the city. (Prior code § 32-1-3)
11.08.030
Telephone harassment.
A. A person is guilty of telephone harassment if,
with intent to annoy or alarm another, he/she:
1. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, without purpose of lawful communication, including but not limited to making a call
or calls and then terminating the call before conversation ensues; or
2. Makes repeated, unwanted telephone calls at
extremely inconvenient hours; or

(Salt Lake City 12-92)

376

__
FIERCE BUTLER.

Georgia

WILLIAM FEW,

-w m^xitur ttnns.J

,

A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to \
curity of a free State, the right of the people fc
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

ABR BALDWIN.

In Convention Monday September 17th 1787.

AMENDMENT i n
[Quartering soldiers.]

Present The States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr.
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North CarolinaSouth Carolina and Georgia. Resolved,
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof
to the United States in Congress assembled.
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention,
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States which shall
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and
the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Constitution. That after such Publication the
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and
Representatives elected: That the Electors should
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the Time and Place assigned;
that the Senators should appoint a President of the
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and
counting the Votes for President; and, that after he
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this
Constitution.
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention.
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary.

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII
AMENDMENT I
[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.

No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quarter
any house, without the consent of the Owner, n
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreaj
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, i
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cat
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particula
describing the place to be searched, and the perm
or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning
Due process of law and just compensate
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, <
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentmei
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arisin
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when ii
actual service in time of War or public danger; no
shall any person be subject for the same offence to b<
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness againsi
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — Punishment]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive

